The Defense Minister of Ukraine, General Stepan Poltorak, paid a visit to Canada last week. By all accounts, it was quite a successful visit, with a number of well-organized meetings and photo ops with Canadian Cabinet Ministers, the signing of a “Defense Cooperation Agreement” with the Canadian military, a visit to CFB Petawawa, a meeting with leaders of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, and the presentation of medals to local activists who have raised a significant amount of assistance, humanitarian and otherwise, for the Ukrainian fighters in Ukraine’s eastern war with Russia.
The PR aspects of the visit were important of course, but one can surmise that the primary reason for the visit was to lobby hard for Canada to loosen its current restrictions about providing lethal arms and technology to Ukraine. This is vital to giving Ukraine’s military better capabilities to counter the Russian state-of-the-art military gear that is being deployed in the current war in the Donbas. Knowledgeable military experts have recently concluded that the Russian proxy forces on Ukraine’s eastern front have as many if not more tanks, artillery, missile systems, anti-aircraft units and other sophisticated weaponry than most of the major European NATO countries. The number of tanks deployed by the rebel forces for instance, is roughly the same as those of England, France or Spain. The signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement is the first step in what Ukraine hopes will enable it to access and purchase military technology that has been restricted up to now.
Of course, this is but one of the many challenges facing Ukraine’s military today. When the fighting broke out some three years ago, Ukraine’s armed forces were woefully unprepared for the conflict. At the time of the Crimean occupation and the outbreak of the fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk, the Ukrainian army could count on no more than five or six thousand combat ready troops. They were poorly equipped and poorly led. The loyalty of most of the senior staff officers was questionable, and the command structure was seriously compromised by Russian intelligence. No doubt, the Russians felt at the time that they would easily roll over any resistance and be able to march on Kyiv with minimal opposition.
Fortunately, that did not happen. Hastily organized volunteer battalions composed largely of Maidan activists and former military veterans were rushed to the front, and in conjunction with regular troops and Ukraine’s National Guard, they succeeded in keeping the so-called “rebel” forces at bay. A crash build-up through conscription and the hiring of contract forces ensued to the point where Ukraine’s combat forces now number somewhere in the vicinity of 250,000 troops. The defense lines have held and the Russian and rebel forces have been unable to gain any further ground in the past year or so.
During his visit, General Poltorak strove to emphasize that there has been significant reform of the military over the past few years and that most of the corruption, competency and supply issues had been resolved. On that score, I am not so sure. While it is true that the armed forces are definitely in much better shape than they were several years ago, independent military experts as well as many of the ordinary fighters on the front would argue that much still remains to be done.
One notable murky area is in the field of procurement. In 2016 the Ukrainian government instituted a transparent and public procurement system called ProZorro that made a huge dent in the rampant corruption that had been endemic in the lucrative business of supplying the government. One area that was not included was defense procurement. In fact, most details on the procurement of military supplies is classified as a state secret. There is no public scrutiny or oversight on the hundreds of millions that are spent each year by the Ukrainian government on military supplies. The fact that some senior politicians and well connected oligarchs have significant interests in defense industry supply companies, has led many to accuse the government of tacitly aiding and abetting corruption in this area.
As for the men on the front lines, there is no shortage of feedback due to the pervasive availability of social media, and much of it is not complimentary. The supply chains are still deemed to be inadequate, and there is much grumbling that senior officers are seldom to be found anywhere near the front lines.
I should make note that there are three broad categories of fighters – regular troops sourced through conscription, professional contract soldiers, and volunteer brigades and battalions that are nominally subordinate to formal army command, but usually operate with a fair degree of autonomy. Of these, the volunteer battalions can be said to be the most experienced and effective, and they usually bear a significant brunt of the fighting. Understandably, the motivation of most conscripts and contract soldiers would primarily be one of survival. The fact that there is an uneasy relationship between the volunteer units and the regular army command structure certainly adds an additional layer of complexity to the conduct of the war.
Fighting a war is obviously no easy matter, and one must give some measure of kudos to Ukraine’s military for holding at bay one of the world’s most ruthless and well-armed military powers. At the same time, to ensure Ukraine’s longer term survival, we must continue to demand that the Ukrainian government and military command do more to cleanse the system of the people and the processes that undermine its full potential.
Share on Social Media
